RESTRUCTURING OF DISCRETE LOGARITHM PROBLEM AND ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM BY USING THE POWER FIBONACCI SEQUENCE MODULE $M$

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Abstract. In this paper, we have studied on adapting to asymmetric cryptography power Fibonacci sequence module $m$. To do this, we have restructured generalized discrete logarithm problem which is one of mathematical difficult problems and generalized ElGamal cryptosystem which is based on this problem by using power Fibonacci sequence module $m$. Then by means of these sequences, we have made a new and different application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using composite modules. Lastly, we have compared that ElGamal Cryptosystem and a new application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem which we made in terms of cryptography and we have obtained that the application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem we restructured by using power Fibonacci sequence module $m$ is more advantageous than ElGamal cryptosystem for $m$ is selected most appropriately large.

Keywords: Power Fibonacci sequence module $m$, Generalized Discrete Logarithm Problem, Generalized ElGamal Cryptosystem, Asymmetric cryptography.

1. INTRODUCTION

The fundamental objective of cryptography is to enable two people, usually referred to as Alice and Bob, to communicate over an insecure channel in such a way that an opponent, Oscar, can’t understand what is being said. This channel could be a telephone line or computer network, for example. The information that Alice wants to send to Bob, which we call ‘plaintext’, can be English text, numerical data, or anything at all- its structure is completely arbitrary. Alice encrypts the plaintext, using a predetermined key, and sends the resulting ciphertext over the channel. Oscar, upon seeing the ciphertext in the channel by eavesdropping, can’t determine what the plaintext was; but Bob, who knows the encryption key, can decrypt the ciphertext and reconstruct the plaintext.

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These ideas are described formally using the following mathematical notation.

**Definition 1.1.** A cryptosystem is a five-tuple \((P, C, K, E, D)\) where the following conditions are satisfied:
1. \(P\) is a finite set of possible plaintexts;
2. \(C\) is a finite set of possible ciphertexts;
3. \(K\) is a finite set of possible keys;
4. For each \(K \in K\), there is an encryption rule \(e_K \in E\) and a corresponding decryption rule \(d_K \in D\). Each \(e_K : P \rightarrow C\) and \(d_K : C \rightarrow P\) are functions such that \(d_K(e_K(x)) = x\) for every plaintext element \(x \in P\).

Fundamentally, there are two types of cryptosystems based on the manner in which encryption-decryption is carried out in the system:
- Symmetric cryptography (secret key cryptosystems)
- Asymmetric cryptography (public key cryptosystems)

The main difference between these cryptosystems is the relationship between the encryption and the decryption key. Logically, in any cryptosystem, both the keys are closely associated. It is practically impossible to decrypt the ciphertext with the key that is unrelated to the encryption key. Algorithms for symmetric cryptography, such as DES [7], use a single key for both encryption and decryption and algorithms for asymmetric cryptography, such as the RSA [6] and ElGamal cryptosystem [4], use different keys for encryption and decryption.

At the very heart of cryptography is the notion of one way function, which was shown to be necessary and sufficient for many cryptographic primitives.

**Definition 1.2.** A one-way function (OWF) is a function \(f\) such that for each \(x\) in the domain of \(f\), it is easy to compute \(f(x)\); but for essentially all \(y\) in the range of \(f\), it is computationally infeasible to find any \(x\) such that \(y = f(x)\).
The following are two examples of candidate one-way functions.

1. **OWF multiplication of large primes**: For primes \( p \) and \( q \), \( f(p, q) = pq \) is a one-way function: given \( p \) and \( q \), computing \( n = pq \) is easy; but given \( n \), finding \( p \) and \( q \) is difficult. The difficult direction is known as the **integer factorization problem**. RSA and many other cryptographic systems rely on this example.

2. **OWF exponentiation in prime fields**: Given a generator \( \alpha \) of \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) for most appropriately large prime \( p \), \( f(a) = \alpha^a \mod p \) is a one-way function. \( f(a) \) is easily computed given \( \alpha \), \( a \), and \( p \); but for most choices \( p \) it is difficult, given \( (y; p; \alpha) \), to find an \( a \) in the range \( 1 \leq a \leq p-1 \) such that \( \alpha^a \mod p = y \). The difficult direction is known as the **discrete logarithm problem**.

However, a one-way function is not sufficient for public-key cryptography if it is equally hard for the legitimate receiver and the adversary to invert. So rather, we need a trapdoor one-way function. A trapdoor one-way function is a one-way function where the inverse direction is easy, given a certain piece of information (the trapdoor), but difficult otherwise. Public-key cryptosystems are based on trapdoor one-way functions. The public key gives information about the particular instance of the function; the private key gives information about the trapdoor [3].

Now, we cite public-key cryptosystems based on the **discrete logarithm problem**. The first and best-known of these is the ElGamal cryptosystem. ElGamal proposed a public-key cryptosystem which is based on the discrete logarithm problem in \( (\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot) \). The encryption operation in the ElGamal cryptosystem is randomized, since ciphertext depends on both the plaintext \( x \) and on the random value \( k \) chosen by Alice. Hence, there will be many ciphertexts that are encryptions of the same plaintext.

**Definition 1.3.** Let \( p \) be a prime number such that the discrete logarithm problem in \( (\mathbb{Z}_p^*, \cdot) \) is infeasible, and let \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) be a primitive element. Let \( P = \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), \( C = \mathbb{Z}_p^* \times \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and define \( K = \{(p, \alpha, a, \beta); \beta = \alpha^a \mod p \} \). The values \( p, \alpha, \beta \) are the public key, and \( a \) is the private key. For \( K = (p, \alpha, a, \beta) \), and for a (secret) random number \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_{p-1} \), define

\[
e_k(x, k) = (y_1, y_2), \quad \text{where} \quad y_1 = \alpha^k \mod p \quad \text{and} \quad y_2 = x \beta^k \mod p.
\]

For \( y_1, y_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), define

\[
d_k(y_1, y_2) = y_2 (y_1^a)^{-1} \mod p.
\]

The system is known as **ElGamal cryptosystem** [1].

**Definition 1.4.** Given a finite cyclic group \( G \) of order \( n \), a generator \( \alpha \) of \( G \), and an element \( \beta \in G \) find the integer \( x \), \( 0 \leq x \leq n-1 \), such that \( \alpha^x = \beta \). The difficult direction is known as the **generalized discrete logarithm problem** [8].
Definition 1.5. Let $G$ be a finite cyclic group such that the generalized discrete logarithm problem is infeasible, and let $\alpha$ be a primitive element of $G$. Let define $K=\{ (\alpha, a, \beta): \beta = \alpha^a \}$. The values $\alpha, \beta$ are the public key, and $a$ $(1 \leq a \leq n-1)$ is the private key. For $K=(\alpha, a, \beta)$, and for a (secret) random number $k$ $(1 \leq k \leq n-1)$, define $e_k(x,k) = (y_1, y_2)$, where $y_1 = \alpha^k$. For $(y_1, y_2)$, define $d_k(y_1, y_2) = y_2(y_1^a)^{-1}$. The system which is based on generalized discrete logarithm problem is known as generalized ElGamal cryptosystem [8].

2. POWER FIBONACCI SEQUENCES

Let $G$ be a bi-infinite integer sequence satisfying the recurrence relation $G_n = G_{n-1} + G_{n-2}$. If $G \equiv 1, \alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3, \ldots (mod\ m)$ for some modulus $m$, then $G$ is called a power Fibonacci sequence modulo $m$ [2].

Example 2.1. Modulo $m = 19$, there are two power Fibonacci sequences: 1, 15, 16, 12, 9, 2, 11, 13, 5, 18, 4, 3, 7, 10, 17, 8, 6, 14, 1, 15, ... and 1, 5, 6, 11, 17, 9, 7, 16, 4, 1, 5, ... Curiously, the second is a subsequence of the first.

In [2], Ide and Renault obtained for modulo 5 there is only one such sequence $(1, 3, 4, 2, 1, 3, ...)$, for modulo 10 there are no such sequences, and for modulo 209 there are four of these sequences. Thus, they obtained the following theorem.

Theorem 2.1. There is exactly one power Fibonacci sequence modulo 5. For $m \neq 5$, there exist power Fibonacci sequences modulo $m$ precisely when $m$ has prime factorization $m = p_1^{e_1}p_2^{e_2}...p_k^{e_k}$ or $m = 5^{e_1}p_2^{e_2}...p_k^{e_k}$, where each $p_i \equiv \pm 1 (mod\ 10)$; in either case there are exactly $2^k$ power Fibonacci sequences modulo $m$ [2].

In this paper, we have examined power Fibonacci sequences modulo $m$ and we have obtained that a power Fibonacci sequence modulo $m$ constitutes a cyclic and multiplicative group whose order is a divisor of $\varphi(m)$ at the same time. That is, If $G \equiv 1, \alpha, \alpha^2, \alpha^3, \ldots (mod\ m)$ is a power Fibonacci sequence modulo $m$, the power Fibonacci sequence constitutes a cyclic and multiplicative group whose generator is $\alpha$. This sequence is a subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_m^*$ (\[ \mathbb{Z}_m^* = \{ x \in \mathbb{Z}_m : (x,m) = 1 \} \}). In addition, when we examine to mathematical difficult problems which are used asymmetric cryptography, we get a generator is necessary for the discrete logarithm problem and generalized discrete logarithm problem. When we have thought all these things together, we have obtained that we can rearrange generalized discrete logarithm problem and so generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using the power Fibonacci sequence module $m$. 

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Moreover, there are two limits in the ElGamal cryptosystem. One is that the plaintext must be less than \( p - 1 \) [5]. So then if \( m \) is chosen a composite number by using the power Fibonacci sequence module \( m \), how does this limit in the ElGamal cryptosystem change? To obtain the answer of this question, firstly, we obtain the following definitions similar to definitions in [3], because we make an application of generalized discrete logarithm problem and generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using the power Fibonacci sequence module \( m \) in terms of convenience.

**Definition 2.1.** Given a generator \( \alpha \) of a chosen subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z}_m^* \) for most appropriately large \( m \) such that \( m \) is one of modulus that satisfied theorem 2.1., \( m \) is one of modulus for which power Fibonacci sequences exist) \( f(\lambda) = \alpha^\lambda \mod m \) is a one-way function. \( f(\lambda) \) is easily computed given \( \lambda \), \( \alpha \), and \( m \); but for most choices \( m \) it is difficult, given \((y; m; \alpha)\), to find an \( \lambda \) such that \( \alpha^\lambda \mod m = y \).

Now, we will obtain public-key cryptosystem based on the definition 2.1.

The system which is restructured by using the power Fibonacci sequence module \( m \) is presented below:

**Definition 2.2.** Let \( m \) be a positive integer such that it provides definition 2.1. in a chosen subgroup of \((\mathbb{Z}_m^*, \cdot)\) is infeasible, and let \( \alpha \in \text{(the chosen subgroup of } \mathbb{Z}_m^*) \) be a primitive element(generator). Let

\[
P = \mathbb{Z}_m \setminus \{0\}, \quad C = (\text{(the chosen subgroup of } \mathbb{Z}_m^*) \times (\mathbb{Z}_m \setminus \{0\})
\]

and define \( K = \{(m, \alpha, \lambda, \beta) : \beta = \alpha^\lambda \mod m \} \). The values \( m, \alpha, \beta \) are the public key, and \( \lambda \) is the private key. For \( K = (m, \alpha, \lambda, \beta) \), and for a (secret) random number \( k \in \mathbb{Z} \), the order of the chosen subgroup, define \( e_k(x,k) = (y_1, y_2) \), where

\[
y_1 = \alpha^k \mod m \quad \text{and} \quad y_2 = x^{\beta^k} \mod m.
\]

Thus, if we look closely, while \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), the plaintext must be less than \( p - 1 \) (\( P = \mathbb{Z}_p^* \)) in the ElGamal cryptosystem, \( \alpha \in \text{(the chosen subgroup of } \mathbb{Z}_m^*) \), the plaintext must be less than \( m - 1 \) (\( P = \mathbb{Z}_m \setminus \{0\} \)) in the application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem which we made by using power Fibonacci Sequence module \( m \). In addition, we know that if in ElGamal cryptosystem \( p \) is a large prime number, in the application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using power Fibonacci sequence module \( m \), \( m \) is more large number such that \( m = p_1 q_2^2 \ldots p_k^c \) or \( m = 5 p_1 q_2^2 \ldots p_k^c \), for each \( p_i \equiv \pm 1 \mod 10 \) is large prime number. That is, if we choose \( m \) is a composite number while making an application of generalized
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3. AN APPLICATION OF GENERALIZED ELGAMAL CRYPTOSYSTEM BY USING THE POWER FIBONACCI SEQUENCE MODULE M

Small examples illustrate following.

Example 3.1. Suppose $m=209$ which provides theorem 2.1 and so $Z_{209}^* = \{ x \in Z_{209}, (x, 209) = 1 \}$, module $m=209$, there are four power Fibonacci sequences:

1, 15, 16, 31, 47, 78, 125, 203, 119, 113, 23, 136, 159, 86, 36, 122, 158, 71, 20, 91, 111, 202, 104, 97, 201, 89, 81, 170, 42, 3, 45, 48, 93, 141, 25, 166, 191, 148, 130, 69, 199, 59, 49, 108, 157, 56, 4, 60, 64, 124, 188, 103, 82, 185, 58, 34, 92, 126, 9, 135, 144, 70, 5, 75, 80, 155, 26, 181, 207, 179, 177, 147, 115, 53, 168, 12, 180, 192, 163, 146, 100, 37, 137, 174, 102, 67, 169, 27, 196, 14, 1, 15, …

1, 81, 82, 163, 36, 199, 26, 16, 42, 58, 100, 158, 49, 207, 47, 45, 92, 137, 20, 157, 177, 125, 93, 9, 102, 111, 4, 115, 119, 25, 144, 169, 104, 64, 168, 23, 191, 5, 196, 201, 188, 180, 159, 130, 80, 1, 81, …

1, 129, 130, 50, 180, 21, 201, 13, 5, 18, 23, 41, 64, 105, 169, 65, 25, 90, 115, 205, 111, 107, 9, 116, 125, 32, 157, 189, 137, 117, 45, 162, 207, 160, 158, 109, 58, 167, 16, 183, 199, 173, 163, 127, 81, 208, 80, 79, 159, 29, 188, 8, 196, 204, 191, 186, 168, 145, 104, 40, 144, 184, 119, 94, 4, 98, 102, 200, 93, 84, 177, 52, 20, 72, 92, 164, 47, 2, 49, 51, 100, 151, 42, 193, 26, 10, 36, 46, 82, 128, 1, 129, … and

1, 195, 196, 182, 169, 142, 102, 35, 137, 172, 100, 63, 163, 17, 180, 197, 168, 156, 115, 62, 177, 30, 207, 28, 26, 54, 80, 134, 5, 139, 144, 74, 9, 83, 92, 175, 58, 24, 82, 106, 188, 85, 64, 149, 4, 153, 157, 101, 49, 150, 199, 140, 130, 61, 191, 43, 25, 68, 93, 161, 45, 206, 42, 39, 81, 120, 201, 112, 104, 7, 111, 118, 20, 138, 158, 87, 36, 123, 159, 73, 23, 96, 119, 6, 125, 131, 47, 178, 16, 194, 1, 195, …

We have chosen one of these power Fibonacci sequences. Curiously,
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is both a subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z}_{209}^* \) and a power Fibonacci sequence modulo 209. \( \alpha \) is a primitive element of the chosen subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z}_m^* \). So, the primitive element \( \alpha = 15 \).

Let \( \lambda = 78 \), so \( \beta = 15^{78} \pmod{209} = 163 \).

Now, suppose that Alice wishes to send the message \( x = 201 \) to Bob. Say \( k = 67 \) is the random integer she chooses. Then she computes

\[
\begin{align*}
  y_1 &= \alpha^k \pmod{m} = 15^{67} \pmod{209} = 181, \\
  y_2 &= x\beta^k \pmod{m} = 201.163^{67} \pmod{209} = 201.125 = 45.
\end{align*}
\]

Alice sends \( y = (y_1, y_2) = (181, 45) \) to Bob.

When Bob receives the ciphertext \( y = (181, 45) \), he computes

\[
x = y_2 (y_1^{-1} \pmod{209}) = 201.181^{78^{-1} \pmod{209}} = 201.125^{-1} \pmod{209} = 201.
\]

which was the plaintext that Alice encrypted.

**Example 3.2.** Suppose \( m = 1045 \) which provides theorem 2.1 and so \( \mathbb{Z}_{1045}^* = \{ x \in \mathbb{Z}_{1045} : (x, 1045) = 1 \} \), module \( m = 1045 \), there are four power Fibonacci sequences:


\[1, 433, 434, 867, 256, 78, 334, 412, 746, 113, 859, 972, 786, 713, 454, 122, 576, 698, 229, \]
Curiously, we have chosen one of these power Fibonacci sequences.


We have chosen one of these power Fibonacci sequences. Curiously,

\[
\begin{align*}
\end{align*}
\]

is both a subgroup of \( \mathbb{Z}_{1045}^* \) and a power Fibonacci sequence for module 1045. \( \alpha \) is a
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primitive element of the chosen subgroup of $\mathbb{Z}_m^*$. So, the primitive element $\alpha = 338$.

Let $\lambda = 547$, so $\beta = 338^{547} \pmod{1045} = 222$.

Now, suppose that Alice wishes to send the message $x = 1001$ to Bob. Say $k = 162$ is the random integer she chooses. Then she computes

$$y_1 = \alpha^k \pmod{m} = 338^{162} \pmod{1045} = 229,$$

$$y_2 = x\beta^k \pmod{m} = 1001.222^{162} \pmod{1045} = 1001.609 = 374.$$

Alice sends $y = (y_1, y_2) = (229, 374)$ to Bob.

When Bob receives the ciphertext $y = (229, 374)$, he computes

$$x = y_2 (y_1^{\lambda})^{-1} \pmod{m} = 374.(229^{547})^{-1} \pmod{1045} = 374.609^{-1} \pmod{1045} = 374.894 \pmod{1045} = 1001$$

which was the plaintext that Alice encrypted.

4. CONCLUSION

In this study, we have adapted to public key cryptography power Fibonacci sequence module $m$. To do this, we have examined power Fibonacci sequence module $m$ and we have obtained that a power Fibonacci sequence module $m$ constitutes a cyclic and multiplicative group whose order is a divisor of $\varphi(m)$ at the same time. So, we have obtained that we are able to reconstruct generalized discrete logarithm problem and generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using the power Fibonacci sequence module $m$. Thus, we made a new and different application of generalized discrete logarithm problem and generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using the power Fibonacci sequence module $m$.

In addition, one of two limits in the ElGamal cryptosystem is that the plaintext must be less than $p-1$ [5]. We have compared that ElGamal Cryptosystem and a new application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem which we made by using power Fibonacci sequence module $m$ in terms of this limit and we have obtained that while $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, the plaintext must be less than $p-1$ ($P = \mathbb{Z}_p^*$) in the ElGamal cryptosystem, $\alpha \in (the \ chosen \ subgroup \ of \ \mathbb{Z}_m^*)$, the plaintext must be less than $m-1$ ($P = \mathbb{Z}_m^* \setminus \{0\}$) in the different application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem which we made by using power Fibonacci sequence module $m$. 
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Moreover, we know that if in ElGamal cryptosystem $p$ is a large prime number, in the application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem we made by using power Fibonacci sequence module $m$, $m$ is more large number such that $m=p_1^{e_1}p_2^{e_2}...p_k^{e_k}$ or $m=5p_1^{e_1}p_2^{e_2}...p_k^{e_k}$, for each $p_i \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{10}$ is large prime number. That is, if we choose $m$ is a composite number while making an application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using the power Fibonacci sequence module $m$, we obtain that this limit decreases as $m$ increases for $m$ is selected most appropriately large.

Thus, by means of the cryptosystem which we restructured, we have made a different application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem by using composite modulus and we also obtained that the restructured cryptosystem is more advantageous than ElGamal cryptosystem in terms of cryptography for $m$ is selected most appropriately large. Because, in comparison with ElGamal cryptosystem, in the application of generalized ElGamal cryptosystem we made, the number of data which must try to understand the message increases for one who doesn’t know the private key.

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